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Wagstaff ’s Definition of Hypnosis
As Wagstaff (this issue) notes, finding a 
definition of hypnosis upon which hypnosis 
scholars can agree has proven to be a hercu-
lean task that has eluded the best efforts of 
individuals and committees.  Wagstaff’s pro-
posed revision of the APA definition of hyp-
nosis (American Psychological Association, 
1994), which is the last paragraph of his ar-
ticle, is one of the best I have seen.  Whether 
it succeeds in achieving a consensus among 
hypnosis scholars remains to be seen, but it 
has much to recommend it.  The inclusion of 
the term alleged is especially important, as it 
is noncommittal with respect to the question 
of whether hypnotic procedures produce a 
specifically hypnotic state.  This may allow 
acceptance of the definition by scholars with 
substantially different theoretical views on 
the subject.  It also insures that hypnosis can 
exist even if the alleged altered state does 
not, in the same way that séances exist even 
if communication with the dead does not.  
There are two approaches to defining 
hypnosis (Kirsch et al., 2011).  One is a nar-
row definition in which it hypnosis is linked 
to the administration of a hypnotic induc-
tion (Kirsch, et al., 2011) or the acceptance 
of the idea that one is in a hypnotic state 
(Wagstaff, this issue).  There is also a broader 
approach to defining hypnosis, according 
to which hypnosis is defined as a domain of 
characteristic phenomena, central to which 
is the administration of imaginative sug-
gestions (Hilgard, 1973).  Imaginative sug-
gestions is a term coined by Braffman and 
Kirsch (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999) to de-
scribe the kinds of suggestions used in hyp-
nosis scales, as distinct from other types of 
The Journal of
Irving Kirsch, PhD*
March, 2014
* Beth Israel Deacon-
ess Medical Center, 
Harvard Medical 
School, 330 Brookline 
Ave, Boston, MA, 
02215 
School of Psychology, 
Plymouth Univer-
sity, Drake Circus, 
Plymouth, Devon, PL4 
8AA, UK
e-mail: i.kirsch@hull.
ac.uk
suggestion (e.g., those associated with the 
placebo effect and the misinformation effect). 
Broadly defined, the domain of hypnosis in-
cludes responding to imaginative suggestions 
without the induction of hypnosis, regardless 
of the presence or absence of a hypnotic state.
Preferences between these narrow and 
broad approaches to defining hypnosis vary 
and do not seem correlated with theoretical 
stances on the altered state issue (Kirsch, et 
al., 2011).  Wagstaff (this issue) argues strong-
ly for a narrow definition.  Although I do not 
have a strong preference and have vacillated 
greatly on the issue, I think that some of his 
objections can be countered easily.  Wagstaff 
argues that a broad definition leads to con-
torted terminology, such as ‘hypnotic hypno-
sis’ and ‘hypnotic non-hypnosis’.  However, 
this results from mixing narrow and broad 
definitions.  Consistent use of terms from 
one or the other need not result in verbal 
contortions.
A central concern that Wagstaff raises is 
that any definition that does not include the 
notion of an altered state loses sight of the ety-
mological origins of the term.  However, there 
are many examples of scientific definitions 
that have been changed in response to em-
pirical and theoretical advances.  According 
to most dictionary definitions, for example, 
gravity is a force by which bodies are drawn 
towards each other.  According to the theory 
of general relativity, however, gravity is not a 
force.  Instead, it is a byproduct the curvature 
of spacetime.  So, should we neutralize or wa-
ter down the definition of gravity, or should 
we respect the etymological roots of the 
term, keep the concept of an attractive force 
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as central to its definition, and then conclude 
that gravity does not exist?  
Here is are examples closer to home.  For 
the last century, the terms mesmerism and 
animal magnetism have been considered 
synonymous with hypnosis.  This can be seen 
in common dictionary definitions of mes-
merism  and in Binet and Féré’s (1888) clas-
sic work on animal magnetism, where they 
state that “magnetism and hypnotism are 
fundamentally synonymous terms (p.  67).” 
So are mesmerism and animal magnetism 
hypnosis?  Only if we accept definitions 
that Mesmer and his followers would never 
have recognized.  And let us not forget that 
original definition of hypnosis was “nervous 
sleep” (Braid, 1843).  If we were to be true 
to our etymological origins, nervous sleep 
would remain the definition of hypnosis, and 
we would all have to agree that hypnosis does 
not exist.
One of the problems in defining hypnosis 
is its relation to hypnotizability.  If hypnosis 
is defined as a hypothesized altered state (al-
beit one with unknown or disputed charac-
teristics),  then what we call hypnotizability, 
as conventionally measured, is a misnomer 
(Kirsch, 1997; Weitzenhoffer, 1980).  Wagstaff 
(this issue) is well aware of this, and given his 
definition of hypnosis, he is correct in noting 
that self-report hypnotic depth scales are the 
most direct measures of hypnotizability.  If 
hypnosis is the acceptance of the suggestion 
to enter a hypnotic state, then the experi-
ence of that state is it operational definition. 
Responses to suggestion are measures of sug-
gestibility, not of hypnotizability.  However, 
Wagstaff then goes on to suggest that cur-
rent “hypnotizability” scales, which measure 
suggestibility, can be used as indirect proxy 
measures of hypnotizability, because of their 
high correlation with hypnotic depth scales. 
This may put us on a slippery slope, as there 
is already a tendency to confuse hypnotiz-
ability with primary or imaginative sug-
gestibility.  Furthermore, the correlation 
holds only if a hypnotic induction has been 
used.  In the absence of a hypnotic induc-
tion, highly suggestible people respond well 
to hypnotic suggestion but rate themselves 
as not being hypnotized (Mazzoni et al., 
2009).  More important, why should we use 
proxy measures, when valid and reliable di-
rect measures are available?  We should use 
intelligence tests rather than socio economic 
status to measure intelligence, and blood 
alcohol levels rather than impulsiveness to 
measure intoxication.  Similarly, if we adopt 
Wagstaff’s (this issue) proposed definition 
of hypnosis, we should use hypnotic depth 
scales, not suggestibility scales, to measure 
hypnotizability . 
Despite these quibbles, Wagstaff’s (this 
issue) article is an important contribution to 
the ongoing discussion about definitions of 
hypnosis and hypnotizability.  His proposed 
definition is as good or better than any nar-
row definition of hypnosis that I have seen 
and should be considered seriously as a con-
tender consensual adoption.
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